



THE EAST INDIA COMPANY: THE FIRST MODERN MULTINATIONAL? 
A popular parlour game among historians is debating when the modern world began. 
Was it when Johannes Gutenberg invented the printing press, in 1440? Or when 
Christopher Columbus discovered America, in 1492? Or when Martin Luther 
published his 95 theses, in 1517? All popular choices. But there is a strong case to be 
made for a less conventional answer: the modern world began on a freezing New 
Year's Eve, in 1600, when Elizabeth I granted a company of 218 merchants a 
monopoly of trade to the east of the Cape of Good Hope. 
The Economist, December 17, 2011 
In many ways the EIC was a model of corporate efficiency: 100 years into its history, 
it had only 35 permanent employees in its head office. Nevertheless, that skeleton 
staff executed a corporate coup unparalleled in history: the military conquest, 
subjugation and plunder of vast tracts of southern Asia. It almost certainly remains the 
supreme act of corporate violence in world history. For all the power wielded today 
by the world’s largest corporations – whether ExxonMobil, Walmart or Google – they 
are tame beasts compared with the ravaging territorial appetites of the militarised East 
India Company. Yet if history shows anything, it is that in the intimate dance between 
the power of the state and that of the corporation, while the latter can be regulated, it 
will use all the resources in its power to resist. 
William Dalrymple, The Guardian, March 4, 2015 
Introduction 
The Roman Catholic Church must be considered the world’s first multi-
national corporation. While The Church’s concerns were ostensibly more spiritual 
than material its role in plundering the mineral riches of the Americas to decorate its 
churches ensured an economic dimension. However, the East India Company can lay 
claim to being the world’s first company whose operations involved systematic 
organization of multiple countries focused substantially more on material rather than 
spiritual relations. As The Economist (2011), in posing the origins of the modern 
world, goes on to say  
The East India Company foreshadowed the modern world in all sorts of 
striking ways. It was one of the first companies to offer limited liability to its 
shareholders. It laid the foundations of the British empire. It spawned 
Company Man. And—particularly relevant at the moment—it was the first 
state-backed company to make its mark on the world … 
 
Given that the East India Company was one of the world’s first multinationals 
a key research question must be what kind of multinational it was and to what extent 
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did it prefigure more contemporary forms of multinational enterprise?  Drawing on 
historical evidence and discussion and relating these to contemporary accounts of 
multinationals, this chapter will seek to answer these questions. It will be argued that, 
despite its archaism, many elements of the template for multinational management 
and organization were first established during the career of the East India Company. 
As Robins (2006) argues, the East India Company pioneered the model of the 
corporation that we see today. Its innovations included the shareholder model of 
ownership, and the administrative framework of the modern firm. 
 
The East India Company 
Foundations 
The East India Company was a monopoly, licensed by the state1. Under its 
Charter, granted by the Crown in December 1600, the merchants who constituted the 
East India Company enjoyed a monopoly on the direct trade in goods between 
England and East Asia. The East India Company was founded initially as an 
import/export company. From the headquarters in London ‘supercargoes’ were 
dispatched as the basis for trade under the control of the ‘factors’ that accompanied 
them, to be traded either from the ships that set sail or from ‘factories’ that were 
established on land as trading posts.  
The factors were the earliest multinational managers. They had a great deal of 
complexity to manage. Given their international business operations there was 
significant spatial separation of their peripheral business units from the centre of 
operations in London with geographical, political, socioeconomic, cultural and 
religious boundaries framing these peripheral actors and actions, far from the centre 
of affairs in London. Given the limitations of contemporary communications the 
factors were highly autonomous. They were institutional entrepreneurs in a very 
literal sense: they had to make up the rules of global trade as they constructed it. It 
would take between four to six months for any despatch to arrive from London and it 
could only travel as the southwest monsoon allowed its vessel to round the Cape of 
Good Hope and blow the sails northeast from May to October. Reporting back to head 
                                                 
1 One general history of the East India Company is John Keay’s (1993) weighty The Honourable 
Company: A History of the East India Company. More economical is The Guardian Podcast Audio Long 
Read by the redoubtable historian of India, William Dalrymple (2015), titled ‘The East India Company: 




office was equally as onerous: one could only set sail during the northeast monsoon 
between November and April. Surveillance of the periphery by the centre was 
virtually impossible under these circumstances.  
Considerable seamanship, comprising knowledge of coastal geography, 
seasons, currents, winds and seaworthy passages, was necessary to make the 
hazardous journey. A strong constitution was required, especially in transit through 
the ‘Roaring Forties’. Initially, the East India Company’s agents sought mimetic 
isomorphism: their initial forays were made in the wake of established Portuguese and 
Dutch traders. Initially they sought to cut into the spice trade that the Dutch 
dominated from their foothold in Bantam, Java.  Bantam was situated at the mouth of 
the Banten River, which provided a navigable passage for light craft into the island's 
interior and that was strategically close to the Sunda Strait through which ships sailed 
between Java and Sumatra.  
The Dutch and the Portuguese had already secured landfall at the most 
propitious sites for the spice trade. The best niches were already occupied, hence the 
East India Company’s early forays into the spice trade were to prove unsuccessful, 
finding their egress and trading opportunities effectively blocked by the competition 
from the Netherlands: the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compangie or Dutch East India 
Company. They were no more successful in the China trade, initially, or in Japan, 
where their early foothold near Nagasaki lasted only a few years. As Foster (1933) 
suggests, it was less design and more default that turned the endeavours of the 
company to the Indian subcontinent.  
The Dutch East India Company was the pioneer in terms of systematic 
European trade with Asia but they copied the East India Company’s organizational 
structure. In their earliest voyages, a company was set up for the duration of a single 
voyage only, and was liquidated upon the return of the fleet. Such voyages were very 
risky. Piracy, disease and shipwreck were misadventures that might befall the ship. 
Should the ship make it safely back to Rotterdam with a cargo of spices from the 
Spice Islands that we now know as present day Indonesia the success of the venture 
would depend on market forces. Inelastic demand and relatively elastic supply of 
spices made for highly speculative profits. If two rival ships were landed in the same 
season prices could tumble; if ships were lost at sea and one made it to harbour then 
the investors would be price makers.  
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The particular insight of the East India Company was to manage these risks 
through forming a cartel that created a monopoly enterprise in 1600, thereby 
threatening their Dutch competitors with ruin (De Vries & Van der Woude, 1997). 
The Dutch response was relatively swift. Two years later the Dutch government 
followed suit, sponsoring the creation of a single "United East Indies Company", to 
which it granted a monopoly over the Asian trade. The charter of the new company 
empowered it to build forts, maintain armies, and conclude treaties with Asian rulers. 
It was licensed for 21 years, with a financial accounting only at the end of each 
decade (De Vries & Van der Woude 1997). Initially, the two monopolies competed 
against each other in the East Indies spice trade. However, in 1623 the torture and 
execution by the Dutch of ten men in the service of the East India Company for 
treason, conspiring against Dutch interests on the island of Amboyna, which was at 
that time the centre of Dutch interests, led to the English quitting the far east Indies 
and refocusing activities on the Indian subcontinent.  
 
Competition and containment 
The Indian subcontinent was not a blank space. One of the largest empires and 
civilizations of that time confronted the factors once they had made landfall in India: 
the Mughal Empire. Nor were they the first Europeans to seek a niche as a coastal 
enclave. The Portuguese had arrived there first at Surat in the Mughal Subah of 
Gujarat. To make landfall the agents of the East India Company had first to defeat a 
Portuguese squadron moored at Swally Hole, the deep-water anchorage for Surat.  
To trade in Gujarat was subject to strict conditions. They had to gain a firman 
or decree from the Emperor that allowed them to trade. Extensive politics 
circumscribed their business: while they were permitted a factory in which they could 
live and from which they could conduct trade they were subject to strict limits on 
access to resources. They could not buy property; they were kept distant from the 
river, the main conduit for traffic, because of fear of both their everyday behaviours 
defiling local customs centred on the practice of Islam in the mosque close by the 
river by literal as well as fear of ritual pollution (Hiromu 2009, p. 221). The everyday 
life of the factors and their English employees was quite primitive: until the mid-
eighteenth century they lived in tents on the beach (Hiromu 2009, p. 203), so offence 
was easily given and taken.  
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Expatriate managers and employees lived in a hellhole, according to 
contemporary accounts. Being an expatriate was no lotus life: the risks were plenty 
and included dysentery, hepatitis, malaria, cholera and plague, with the attractions 
limited to the sex and drugs available. Of the former there was a plentiful supply: the 
prostitutes who serviced the Company lived adjacent in thatched huts while the drugs 
of choice included lashings of rum and toddy. Alcohol, sexual relations with 
prostitutes and etiquette – or the lack of it – associated with toilet functions were main 
causes of local offence taken with these infidels. 
From the vantage point of Surat the factors strove to establish the rules of the 
game of trade as they wished to define them.  Essentially, this meant establishing 
competitive advantage by whatever means were available, often through quite intense 
conflicts from which they sought to emerge as victors or treaty partners.  
Opportunities beckoned: in 1614 two members of the company trekked overland to 
Isfahan, the seat of the Shah of Persia, via Khandahar in Afghanistan. The Shah 
sought to treat with them by offering them free trade in return for their alliance 
against the Portuguese whose fortress and emporium at Hormuz dominated the 
Hormuz straits at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. An alliance of convenience, or at 
least a coalition of interests ensued, linking the strategies of the Shah and the 
Company (Kalyvas, 2006, p. 383). By 1622 the Company delivered on the alliance: a 
joint Anglo-Persian attack levelled the fortress. The Company’s reward was the 
granting of a factor at Bandar Abbas and a half share in the control of customs 
revenues flowing through it as a port city.  The major trade was in silk (Darwin 2012, 
p. 53). 
From their strategic vantage point in the Gulf the Company sought to compete 
with its rivals, notably the Dutch. It did so by establishing itself in what is now Tamil 
Nadu, in modern Chennai, known at that time as Madras, where they established 
Georgetown, centred on Fort St George, which was to remain the major trading post 
until the middle of the eighteenth century. The Company’s commercial presence was 
literally hedged in. Foreign direct investment was allowed the Company only in the 
form of a lease of a territory limited to five miles frontage on the coast and one mile’s 
depth into the interior. By mid-century 300,000 people lived in the leasehold 




Amongst the 300,000 people wedged into the trading zone very few were 
expatriate staff: only twenty-seven were Company men, although there was a garrison 
of some 300 or so men. The European’s in the Company’s territory were not wholly 
English: they numbered Iberian Jews, Armenians and Portuguese, such that the quasi-
colony had a multicultural flavour. But overall, the culture was one of Little England, 
centred on the Anglican church of St Mary’s, the consumption of typical imported 
English foodstuffs and beverages, the favouring of Anglo dress codes for Company 
employees, supplemented by prodigious consumption of brandy, plus the adoption of 
some local habits: concubinage, chewing betel nuts and smoking hookahs. Life lived 
within the enclave was one of constant awareness of the risks of blockade or attack. 
 
Alliances 
The reality of life under pressure was the necessity of alliances with locals. 
Alliances are, for everyone involved in them, a means rather than an end. The point of 
an alliance is to achieve something or other. Negotiations between political coalitions 
create the ordering of goals in organizations (March, 1962). Such negotiations can 
criss-cross organizations: they may occur at the departmental level, around specific 
strategic projects or over specific strategic issues. Interests that might align on one 
occasion will not necessarily cohere on another. When the power elites surrounding 
them changed their alliances changed. The institutional frame of life in the enclave 
was determined as much by adaptation to local conditions as by the import of alien 
custom, dress, food and religion. For instance, the British were lenient in their 
punishment of misdemeanours according to the local criminal code, which caused 
occasional offence. The enforcement of that code was allied with the norms of locals 
employed as adhikari or ‘law men’ but tempered by British norms.   
Strategies decided at the centre, in this case in London, may order goals but 
they cannot always ensure their implementation in far-flung corners of the 
organizational empire. Sometimes the strategic centre of an organization can be at a 
great distance, in knowledge terms, from those places where implementation occurs: 
this often happens in organizations that have subsidiaries, despite strong central 
direction. The blocking, modifying and avoiding of central directives is sometimes a 
way of maintaining the discretion to adapt, creatively, what might not otherwise work 
locally (Sharpe, 2001; Becker-Ritterspach et al, 2002: see Dörrenbächer & Geppert 
2009, p. 203). For instance, according to Company rules, traders were supposed to 
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trade only within the remit of the Company. Evidently this was not the case: although 
it practised a mock bureaucracy of enforcement the rule was honoured as much in the 
breach as in the stipulation. As Darwin (2012, p. 57) explains, at least two of the 
governors made colossal fortunes in Madras, including a native of Boston, 
Massachusetts, who was titular founder of Yale University as well as a forebear of 
William Pitt (the Younger), a future British Prime Minister, whose fortunes were thus 
founded. 
To look at strategy as it is formulated at the centre is to look only at the 
centripetal controls: we need also to consider the centrifugal forces (Morgan, 2001). 
Recognizing that organizations, especially where they are large, complex and multi-
national, will be simultaneously subject to centripetal control and centrifugal forces, 
should ensure that we recognize the reality of strategic interests and micro-politics in 
the making of strategic practices. What is at issue is how certain practices become 
crucial in determining what is considered to be a strategic interest.  Some actors will 
have micro-political skills that ensure certain positions are blocked and certain others 
advanced in terms of the strategic agenda (Johnson et al, 2003). Today, this is referred 
to in the literature as ‘issue-selling’: the strategies through which subsidiaries translate 
issues to be understandable by the parent company, thus enrolling them to act with 
respect to the issue. Successfully doing this allows the subsidiary to increase its 
bargaining power, in terms of the subsidiary’s future ability to influence or shape 
parent-company decision-making (Luo, 2005). Theoretically, subsidiary bargaining 
power typically increases the more the parent company depends on resources it 
controls; where the subsidiary is able to legitimize its existence and behaviour, and 
when there is a close and personal relationship between decision makers at the parent 
and in the subsidiary company. The East India Company satisfied the first two of 
these criteria and could safely ignore the third because of the geographical and 
temporal distance at which the factors worked from investors in the city of London 
(Gammelgaard, 2009). 
 
Strategy and public policy 
Central corporate political strategies that seek to affect the public policy 
environment in a favourable way (Baysinger, 1984) are a major part of the strategy 
arsenal. Vernon (1971) suggested that, strategically, multinational companies (MNCs) 
with substantial investments would seek to influence host-country government 
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policies to protect earnings and produce a favourable regulatory environment. The 
East India Company certainly confirmed to this strategy. The Company could not help 
but be a quasi-public actor because its activities were a highly intrusive form of 
politicization in the pre-modern territories in which it operated. Its presence created 
unintended side effects of economic imperialism for which there was a lack of any 
global regulation. As Young (2003, p. 40) suggests, ‘agents are responsible for 
injustice by virtue of their structural connection to it, even though they are not to 
blame for it’. It was largely through the bribery and corruption of local regimes that 
the Company operated and established locally favourable regulatory regimes. The 
Company yielded economic, social, and political power comparable to the power of 
modern nation states. It assumed political responsibilities of tax raising and defence 
that once were governmental responsibilities. Theoretically, it is significant to note 
that the Company assumed these legitimate governmental functions not through 
attaining isomorphism with the existing institutional frameworks of the territories in 
which it operated but through their systematic subversion and corruption.   
From the mid-1740s onwards, the Company’s strategic concerns were 
advanced not so much through trade but through war and allied diplomacy.  The host 
country ruler, the Mughal Emperor in Delhi, had become little more than a symbol 
due to events in Europe. In 1744 Britain and France were at war over Austria and thus 
the balance of European power. The French, who had a base in Pondicherry, launched 
an attack and seized Madras in 1746. Although peace was declared in 1748 and the 
British recovered Madras an undeclared war continued in South India. The Madras 
garrison was strengthened with 2,000 men, including 500 Swiss mercenaries. Local 
allies were bribed and threatened and strategic alliances forged with local princes. In 
return for military services rendered the Company began to acquire extensive revenue 
rights over increasing swathes of territory. The Company sought little consensus with 
subject peoples in terms of formally respecting traditional customs and values 
(cognitive legitimacy). In terms of the improvements of public works, such as port 
facilities, there was some attempt to seek legitimacy by contributing to the public 
good (pragmatic legitimacy). On the whole, however, legitimacy was bought and 
fought for, bribed and imposed. The pursuit of such legitimacy is fragile and 
dependent on the flow of bribes and the balance of force as a political strategy. 
The choice of political strategies depends on the bargaining power of MNC 
subsidiaries compared to that of the host-country (Blumentritt, 2003). Boddewyn and 
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Brewer (1994) argue that host governments represent both strategic risks and 
opportunities: governments may appropriate value from MNCs but they can also 
protect it (e.g., Boddewyn, 1975; 1988; 1993; Moran, 1985; Rugman & Verbeke, 
1993; Eden & Molot, 2002). In 1756 protection turned to expulsion as the Nawab of 
Bengal expelled the company from the lucrative factory that it had established in 
Calcutta through which fine cotton fabrics passed for resale in Europe. Company 
employees were put to death; others were imprisoned, the fort was overrun. But the 
company now had an army: the balance of power and strategic advantage with the 
host government of the Nawab was changing. Under the command of General Clive 
the Nawab’s forces were defeated at Plassey and within ten years the Company 
effectively controlled not only the territory but also the revenues of the province. 
Within forty years, Company men ruled in Delhi. An Indian empire, with modest 
mercantile origins, was born.  
 
The East India Company and its shifting mandate 
Any MNC comprises a highly complex configuration of ongoing micro-
political power conflicts at different levels. Social actors and groups inside and 
outside the firm interact with each other and create temporary balances of power. 
Sometimes external organizations can succeed in changing organizational mandates. 
Mandates are tasks that are assigned to subsidiaries by headquarters or that are 
acquired independently by the subsidiary, which have a specific time and content 
limitation placed on them, framing the internal division of labour within a MNC. The 
division of labour of the East India Company was changing. It was no longer a 
Company of traders so much as a de facto government after 1765 when the Company 
assumed the right to collect revenue (diwani) in return for a fixed payment to the 
Mughal Emperor, Shah Alam. Not only did the Company become a tax collector it 
also created a military organization that fought wars against existing states in order to 
extend its control up the Ganges valley and inland from Madras, where it fought 
against Mysore, a ‘rising state’ (Darwin, 2012, p. 77).  
Within a few years, 250 company clerks backed by the military force of 
20,000 locally recruited Indian soldiers had become the effective rulers of 
Bengal. An international corporation was transforming itself into an 




Mandates relate directly to the control of resources and the steering of 
potential actions; hence, mandates bestow different propensities for exercising power 
(Cyert & March 1963; Pfeffer & Salancik 1974; Birkinshaw & Ridderstråle 1999). 
When mandates change there is immense potential for conflict within MNCs because 
the relative power relations of the different subsidiaries and the centre change in 
consequence. Any change can be simultaneously a process of downgrading and 
upgrading: as one subsidiary shifts to more or less demanding task all others change 
relatively in their relations with each other and the centre (Dörrenbächer & 
Gammelgaard, 2006). Shifts in these relativities can translate directly into changes in 
status, careers, and incomes, things often hard fought for. 
In the best traditions of enterprise the Company privatised profits while 
socializing losses. In 1770, ‘famine wiped out a third of the population of Bengal, 
reducing local productivity, depressing the Company's business and eventually 
forcing it to go cap in hand to the British government to avoid bankruptcy’ (The 
Economist, 2011). Despite this setback, the Company grew from having a monopoly 
of trade to becoming the tax-collector expropriating surplus from the peoples of India, 
a commercial organisation ruling 90m Indians, controlling 70 million acres (243,000 
square kilometres) of land, issuing its own coins, complete with the Company crest, 
supporting an army of 200,000 men, all of which the East India Company did by 
1800. 
In the case of the East India Company the shift in mandate began to sound 
alarms in London. What was the constitutional status of a company that waged war, 
controlled territory and seemed to act according to no agenda directed from London? 
The fear was that the company was getting too big, too ambitious, in its Indian 
strategies: if it over-extended and its finances failed, the Company’s Directors feared 
something akin to another South Sea Bubble – catastrophic financial failure that could 
ruin the British economy. A formal reframing of mandate ensued, culminating in the 
India Act of 1784. A Board of Control was established in London, reporting to a 
cabinet minister, who now oversaw its Indian budgets for Bombay, Madras and 
Bengal as well as its external military policy and choice of Governor-General. This 
changed mandate and system of control was maintained until the Company’s abolition 
in 1858 when these controls were assumed by the British government through the 





The strategic options open to a MNC are always framed within specific 
contextual factors. A mix of national institutions, economic structures, resources and 
foreign investment policies of the country that is host to the investments made frame 
the context of operations. In the case of the East India Company the context was that 
territory bequeathed by a feudal grant from the Mughal Emperor for which they 
initially paid tribute, before declaring sovereignty over these territories that it ruled 
after 1800. The most pertinent national institutions were the weakness of the Mughal 
Emperor and the treaties that were struck with local Indian rulers. The status of these 
rulers was vague as to whether they were allies or subjects. While the remit of British 
law ran through the Company in principle, in practice there was much observance of 
local customs. Given the small number of Company men and the great mass of 
Indians whose beliefs were so entrenched in religions alien to British Anglicanism, 
interference in cultural practices threatened disorder, especially given the wide 
variance in custom from one religion to another.    
The balance of power does not always lie with the centre, with the MNC 
headquarters. As Dörrenbächer and Gammelgaard (2006, p. 209) suggest, ‘a career-
oriented subsidiary manager’, especially an expatriate, may well manage to decline 
mandate requests from headquarters where they calculate that there is a career 
advantage in doing so. The loyalties of expatriates will usually differ from those of 
host country nationals or third country nationals, with the assumption usually being 
that expatriates are more loyal to headquarters (Harzing, 1999). This was not 
necessarily the case in the East India Company: as remarked, fortunes were there to 
be made and were made by entrepreneurship that often exceeded the company’s 
bounds.  
In MNCs the majority of politics around the strategy process relate to 
mandated change in headquarters/subsidiary relations (Crozier & Friedberg, 1980; 
Dörrenbächer & Gammelgaard 2006, p. 206). The India Act of 1784 stated that ‘to 
pursue schemes of conquest and extension of dominion in India are measures 
repugnant to the wish, the behaviour and the policy of this nation’ (Keith, 1922, 
p.111; cited in Darwin, 2012, p. 124). Mandates, however, shift as contexts shift. 
What transformed the mandate of the East India Company were ‘the rise of Napoleon, 
his invasion of Egypt in 1798 and the prospect of French help for Tipu Sultan, the 
dynamic ruler of Mysore and an inveterate enemy of the British’ (Darwin, 2012, 
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p.125). Mysore was invaded and Tippu killed in 1799 and the French threat receded 
when their navy was defeated in Egypt and their forces retreated. Although one 
balance of power was settled, between Britain and France, the balance in India was 
made more precarious. Mysore entered into a period of warfare with the Maratha 
Empire between 1785 and 1818. In the general weakening of continental power the 
company increasingly filled the role of broker and kingmaker, using military force 
where necessary. 
How Company managers in India managed or ignored these local pressures 
was not a matter for calculation at the corporate centre while it posed real challenges 
for central governance. The Company in London was mostly unable to manage these 
struggles and the challenges that arose, given the complexity of local environments. 
In such a context the Company’s servants, especially officers in the military, profited 
greatly from booty and plunder. ‘On this frontier of empire, it was often hard to 
distinguish the private interest from the public’ (Darwin, 2012, p. 126).  
 
Power, legitimacy, resources and centrality in the East India Company’s strategy 
To be implemented any mandated change needs to accrue legitimacy. 
Legitimacy has been defined as ‘a recognized perception or assumption that the 
actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially 
constructed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions’ (Suchman, 1995, p.574). 
The process of legitimization involves far more than merely developing an agreed 
strategy at the top level of the organization that the strategy team regards as 
appropriate or desirable: it also means implementing it, even against resistance.  
Implementation is complex and difficult in any MNC because it is an 
internally differentiated set of intra-organizational and extra-organizational linkages 
in which resources are constantly being exchanged. The complexity of the networks 
makes it difficult for any nodal point in the network to know where the most critical 
resources reside. The fact that a strategic mandate may be set centrally does not 
necessarily minimize the creative and positive resistance of the margins; suggest 
Bouquet and Birkinshaw (2008, p. 491). Subsidiaries can develop new products and 
markets as the Company did in the opium trade with China, over which it had a 
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monopoly until 1833.2 Radically, the company’s managers in India were constantly 
innovating and, on occasion, seeking to ‘break the rules of the game’ (Markides, 
2000). The capacity to break the rules of the game depends on the structural relations 
that prevail within corporate empires. A great deal of corporate action is 
simultaneously decentralized and linked to corporate strategy. Local actors will use 
the resources that the global centre provides to seek local advantages over local rivals 
while using indigenes to tap into networks and mobilize resources that they would not 
otherwise access. A predictable outcome of such power games is politicization, which 
ensues when the games played by key actors undermine established rules of the game 
and patterns of domination. This was certainly the case in the East India Company, 
where the agents had considerable field autonomy, creating the institutional field in 
which international trade flourished. The emerging institutional field comprised a 
‘network of relations, micro-politics and capillaries of power’ (Clegg et al 2006, p. 
254), in which the rules of the emerging games were not just constraints but also 
enabled the key players building the field in India to play political games against both 
local rulers, competitors and the principals in London (see also Dörrenbächer & 
Geppert, 2009).  
 
Exploiting new business opportunities  
The development of the nineteenth century China trade in opium is a case in 
point of local actors of the company using local resources to access new markets. The 
Indian Mutiny –the Great Rebellion – of 1857 threatened legitimacy most 
dramatically. Despite a standing army of 250,000 men on the Indian subcontinent a 
further 90,000 soldiers of the British Army were sent to restore control. After the 
Great Rebellion, in 1858, the British government took over all administrative duties in 
India. The Company's headquarters in London, East India House, was demolished in 
1862 and its last dividend paid in 1873. Thus an organisation that had been given life 
by the state was eventually extinguished by it. 
Successful strategy in a foreign market means that an enterprise must be better 
at doing what it does than any potential competition not otherwise excluded. 
Comparative advantage might come into play: for instance, Afghanistan is well-suited 
                                                 
2 Julia Lovell’s (2011) The Opium War: Drugs, Dreams and the Making of China is an outstanding 
history of this particular episode in the various wars that have been fought over the drug trade.  
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to growing poppies and has a population used to producing opium for processing into 
heroin with local social institutions, such as powerful regional warlords represented in 
the Afghan government that enable the crop to flourish and be traded internationally, 
despite its stigma. The East India Company, at least until 1833, was deeply involved 
in the opium trade with China, in which they had a monopoly up until 1834, using 
opium as a substitute form of payment for valuable silver traded for Chinese goods. 
The Company encouraged people to use opium in China, as a result of which millions 
of Chinese died from opium addiction. Inadvertently, the grounds for both the 
commercial success of the barren and rocky island of Hong Kong, claimed as a 
British Crown Colony after the first Opium War of 1839-1842, (granted as such by 
the Treaty of Nanking of August 29th that year), as well as the subsequent 
disintegration of society in China that ensued as a result of the opium trade, were 
sown by the East India Company. 
 
Comparative political advantage 
Comparative advantage can explain a few things about strategy in areas of 
primary production where the raw materials are simply not globally available just 
anywhere, such as the opium processed from Afghan poppies. Outside of these 
special cases it does not explain much. Comparative advantage is not merely a result 
of national factor endowments: it is the development of social institutions that provide 
the comparative advantage. For the East India Company these social institutions grew 
out of two core competencies: the ability of the directors in London to manage 
politicians, both at home and abroad; the ability of the Company to treat with, traduce 
and tax opposition to its will.  
Politicians down the ages have been easily managed and the Company, 
untroubled by Independent Commissions Against Corruption, provides the prototype: 
It meant getting close to courtiers who wanted to extract revenue from it and 
exposing itself to politicians who wanted to rewrite its charter. The Whig 
revolutionaries who deposed James II in 1688 briefly promoted a competing 
outfit that the Company first fought and eventually absorbed. Rival merchants 
lobbied courtiers to undermine its monopoly. But for the most part it dealt 
with these political problems brilliantly … The Company created a powerful 
East India lobby in Parliament, a caucus of MPs who had either directly or 
indirectly profited from its business and who constituted, in Edmund Burke's 
opinion, one of the most united and formidable forces in British politics. It 
also made regular gifts to the Court: “All who could help or hurt at Court,” 
wrote Lord Macaulay, “ministers, mistresses, priests, were kept in good 
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humour by presents of shawls and silks, birds' nests and attar of roses, bulses 
of diamonds and bags of guineas.” It also made timely gifts to the Treasury 
whenever the state faced bankruptcy. In short, it acted as what George 
Dempster, a stockholder, called a “great money engine of state”. 
The Company was just as adept at playing politics abroad. It distributed bribes 
liberally: the merchants offered to provide an English virgin for the Sultan of 
Achin's harem, for example, before James I intervened (The Economist, 2011). 
 
Proffering English virgins to Sultan’s and not being able to deliver on the 
goods may have been politically embarrassing but it serves to underline the extent to 
which the strategies of the Company were tangled up with complexities that were 
quite distinct from those that domestic traders might have encountered. As Morgan 
(2011, p. 416) suggests, ‘the specific process of organizing and coordinating activities 
across the borders of distinctive national institutional contexts creates a new and 
distinctive level of complexity in social and organizational relations’. Different 
practices, processes, actors and what Morgan refers to as ‘legitimatory discourses’ 
pertain across different national settings. The East India Company managers had to 
manage the transfer of institutional practices that were legitimate in the home base 
coming into conflict with local institutional practices and sometimes the wrong 
choices are made: English virgins were not for trade.  Certain institutional dualities 
are negotiable; others are not; nonetheless, they are pervasive and must be managed, 
creating a ‘transnational social space’ (Morgan, 2011) in which hybrid norms emerge, 
some of which may be quite problematic for the home base even while utterly 
acceptable in the local institutional context. The necessity of bribery and the purchase 
of favours in order to secure business in certain markets, many of them those 
pioneered by the Company, remains an issue to this day. 
 
Comparative military advantage 
Bribes and influence were one soft face of power, used to buy conditional 
consent, deployed freely at home and in India, where bankrupt rulers could usually be 
bought to deliver commercial access; if needs be the hard edge of power could also be 
deployed where consent was withdrawn or turned into resistance and it was used 
increasingly as the Company became more institutionalized. In this respect, Clive’s 
victory at Plassey in 1757 became the petard with which it hoisted itself. While it 
delivered the government of Bengal to the Company and produced a guaranteed 
income from Bengal's taxpayers it made the Company not so much a trader as ruler.  
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Once Bengal fell into the Company’s remit it innovated new competitive 
strategies. Destroying the competition created markets. The basis on which it 
established the ‘technological superiority’ of the British textile industry was by 
‘systematic destruction of India’s indigenous industry’, not only through the artillery 
of cheap prices, as Marx wrote in Capital, but also through innovative competitive 
strategies such as the severing of the thumbs of master weavers in Bengal [and] 
forced cultivation of indigo by Bihar’s peasants’, as Banerjee (2008: 52) notes. 
Much as any feudal monarch bent on conquest, raising revenue increasingly 
became its first priority. The adjunct of a secure revenue base was a cowed and 
contained populace. The instrument of containment was armed force. As The 
Economist writes: 
Tax rolls replaced business ledgers. Arsenals replaced warehouses. C.N. 
Parkinson summarised how far it had strayed, by 1800, from its commercial 
purpose: “How was the East India Company controlled? By the government. 
What was its object? To collect taxes. How was its object attained? By means 
of a standing army. What were its employees? Soldiers, mostly; the rest, Civil 
Servants”  (The Economist, 2011). 
 
It might be tempting to read the history of the Company as a component part 
of some overall rational strategy of imperialism pursued by the British government. It 
might be tempting but it would be mistaken. As Darwin (2012, p. 389) states, the 
British empire ‘was in the main a private enterprise empire’ in which the ‘role of the 
state was largely confined to the granting of charters that conferred commercial 
monopoly or jurisdictional power on companies or proprietors … this was an empire 
of commercial experiments not an empire of rule by design’.  
 
Comparative efficiency advantage 
MNCs must be able to do what they do more efficiently and effectively than 
local non-MNCs. One thing the Company did very well was to be a monopoly that 
enabled it to set its own prices in the market in a deviation from the simple nostrums 
of perfect competition (Buckley, 2003). The Company also developed managerial 
expertise through its networks of factors on the ground across those parts of India it 
came to dominate. The operating costs in salaries from the central office in London 
were minimal. ‘It ruled millions of people from a tiny headquarters, staffed by 159 in 
1785 and 241 in 1813’ (The Economist, 2011). Of course, given the speed of 
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communications, the central managers could hardly ‘manage’ the regional factories; 
hence, the latter had considerable autonomy.  
Employees were allowed not only to choose how to fulfil their orders, but also 
to trade on their own account. This ensured that the Company was not one but 
two organisations: a hierarchy with its centre of gravity in London and a 
franchise of independent entrepreneurs with innumerable centres of gravity 
scattered across the east. Many Company men did extremely well out of this 
“tight-loose” arrangement, turning themselves into nabobs, as the new rich of 
the era were called, and scattering McMansions across rural England (The 
Economist, 2011).  
 
The Company was adept at overcoming governmental regulations: moving 
inside national territories allowed them either to accord with local laws that might 
limit their capacity to trade as outsiders or, through combinations of soft and hard 
power, bend the rules.  The Company developed superior organizational and strategic 
attributes in extracting goods, collecting taxes and delivering armed services that 
could be readily implanted into new contexts of rule from the bridgeheads.  
 
Comparative institutional advantage 
The Company had to develop, especially in its earliest days, what sociologists 
would call ‘embeddedness’ – deep immersion in local laws, institutions, cultures, 
norms etc. The Company men had a great deal of learning to do, initially, as Darwin 
(2012, p. 52) explains:  
To avoid giving offence, they must learn the court rituals and diplomatic 
procedures of those rulers whose favour thy sought. They could hardly ignore 
the political and geographical upheavals within and between the great Asian 
states that might settle their fate one way or the other. They had to know 
something of the religions and cosmologies of the cultures that lapped around 
them, or risk outrage, expulsion and worse. 
 
The Company was adept at these adjustments, at least before Cilve’s victory at 
Plassy, ‘a victory that owed more to treachery, forged contracts, bankers and bribes 
than military prowess (Dalrymple, 2015). After Plassy the hubris of rulership and the 
arrogance of cultural domination set in, when the Company men began to see 
themselves as masters of the large chunk of the known universe they controlled. In 
their own imagination they ruled far and wide over a great mass of peoples and land; 
in reality, as Darwin (2012, p. 52) suggests, they constituted a ‘microscopic minority 
on the edge of vast civilizations’, subject to ‘the magnet-like force of glamorous 
18 
 
rulership, all-embracing religions and subtle philosophies … more like midgets than 
masters’. 
Not only did the Company men have to learn new ways of being strangers in a 
strange land they also innovated ways of keeping in touch with their old world, if only 
at a considerable distance. ‘The Company pioneered the art of government by writing 
and government by record, to paraphrase Burke. Its dispatches to and from India for 
the 15 years after 1814 fill 12,414 leather-bound volumes. It created Britain's largest 
cadre of civil servants, a term it invented’ (The Economist, 2011). It also operated its 
civil service on merit principles that John Stuart Mill (1848), one of its employees, 
was to distil as fundamental principles of political economy that had an immense 
influence globally on the field of public administration.   
The key institutional innovation in the Company’s strategy that made all other 
innovations possible was arbitrage. Arbitrage is the practice of profiting from 
differences in costs and process across borders – basically buying where prices are 
lowest, selling where prices are greatest. The Company was an extraordinarily 
effective vehicle for integrating the extraction and distribution of goods on this basis. 
To be able to exploit the global opportunities for profit that arbitrage offers, a MNC 
needs strategies that enable it to have maximal flexibility location, know-how and 
knowledge, as well as the ability to react rapidly to threats and opportunities. Reactive 
ability will be limited by the necessity of abiding by the rules of the states in which 
they invest; under these circumstances, a temptation is to either subsume the state 
through soft power or defeat it through hard power, at both of which the Company 
was skilled. It could be said that an early form of governance and organizational 
capability systems (see Whitley 2000) of liberal market economies could already be 
found in the first MNC. It was not so much that the Company was implementing a 
liberal economic vision conceived imperially as that it pioneered strategies that 
increasingly economically liberal states would adopt. Victorian England, with its 
perpetual struggles over the Corn Laws, was hardly a liberal economic state.  
 
The end of the East India Company 
Clive’s 1757 victory at Plassey denoted both the high point of the Company’s 
success in India and the beginning of its slow downfall. Contemporaries likened Clive 
and others of his ilk to unscrupulous conquistadores, butchering, plundering and 
looting with abandon. The effective subjugation of Bengal after Plassy produced a 
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guaranteed income from Bengal's taxpayers while involving the Company 
increasingly less in trade and more in raising revenues through taxes. Administrative 
obligations overtook its trading instincts; routinized raising of revenue increasingly 
displaced entrepreneurial commerce.  
Only seven years after the granting of the Diwani, when the company’s share 
price had doubled overnight after it acquired the wealth of the treasury of 
Bengal, the East India bubble burst after plunder and famine in Bengal led to 
massive shortfalls in expected land revenues. The EIC was left with debts of 
£1.5m and a bill of £1m unpaid tax owed to the Crown. When knowledge of 
this became public, 30 banks collapsed like dominoes across Europe, bringing 
trade to a standstill. 
In a scene that seems horribly familiar to us today, this hyper-aggressive 
corporation had to come clean and ask for a massive government bailout. On 
15 July 1772, the directors of the East India Company applied to the Bank of 
England for a loan of £400,000. A fortnight later, they returned, asking for an 
additional £300,000. The bank raised only £200,000. By August, the directors 
were whispering to the government that they would actually need an 
unprecedented sum of a further £1m. The official report the following year, 
written by Edmund Burke, foresaw that the EIC’s financial problems could 
potentially “like a mill-stone, drag [the government] down into an 
unfathomable abyss … This cursed Company would, at last, like a viper, be 
the destruction of the country which fostered it at its bosom.” (Dalrymple, 
2015). 
 
It was not debt, however, that destroyed the Company. The future of India and 
the demise of the Company were signalled by the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857, which 
sparked the Great Rebellion – or Indian Mutiny as Victorians called it – that saw the 
end of the Company’s rule and the beginnings of British Governmental rule proper. 
Hard power was required. Ninety thousand soldiers from the British Army were 
stationed in India. After the rebellion, fearing the insurgency of the locally sourced 
troops, the British state, which had now taken over the administration of India from 
the wound-up Company, increased the garrison threefold from its pre-Rebellion 
strength, such that a ratio of one British soldier to every two Indian recruits applied, 
all supported at the Indian tax payers’ expense (Darwin 2012, p. 132).  The great 
adventure of the English-speaking world’s first commercial MNC was over. 
 
What can we learn from the East India Company about MNCs? 
Morgan and Kristensen (2006) offer a powerful corrective to some of the 
overly rationalistic and economistic views in the international business, strategy and 
multinationals literature.  
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 [T]he MNC as a totality may be seen as a highly complex configuration of 
ongoing micro-political power conflicts at different levels in which 
strategizing social actors/groups inside and outside the firm interact with each 
other and create temporary balances of power that shape how formal 
organizational relationships and processes actually work in practice. 
Institutions enter into these processes, firstly as co-constitutors of the set of 
actors/groupings and their mutual roles and identities, secondly as forms of 
restriction on the choices actors make, thirdly as resources that empower 
actors and finally as rule-givers for the games that emerge (Morgan and 
Kristensen 2006, p. 1473).  
 
Although written by contemporary organization theorists the analysis applies 
aptly to the East India Company.  Although it was an organization in a commercial 
sense its strategy was not something decided at the hub and then distributed to the 
peripheries. Peripheries are not passive vessels: they do not always wait to see what 
gets poured into them or is denied them. The Company’s periphery comprised 
networked entities embedded in a complex network of partnerships and subjugations 
in which the portfolio of allies was constantly changing due to shifting requirements 
for resources. The Company’s organizational boundaries were fluid and volatile 
incorporating trade, tax collection and suppression of insurrection. In consequence, its 
mandate was shifting not stable, redefining the boundaries of its operations as events 
unfolded. The Company’s capacity to manage these blurred boundaries and networks 
successfully represented a critical strategic ability; the Great Rebellion signalled that 
this ability had become over-extended.  
There are many strategic as well as practical aspects of inter-organizational 
collaboration that are important to consider in alliances and networks. To begin with, 
firms have to assess whether collaboration is a viable strategy to gain access to 
important resources, then they have to find suitable partners, negotiate terms and 
conditions, implement governance structures, processes and policies, and choose and 
integrate the management and team members. Ultimately, they need to know when to 
best exit partnerships, the test that the Company failed. 
Despite its failure under the weight of the problems it created for itself and the 
British government, the Company prefigures many lessons for MNCs. It teaches the 
importance of expatriate managers becoming embedded – but not too embedded. It 
teaches the importance of expatriate managers becoming entrepreneurial – but not so 
entrepreneurial as to inflame jealousies at home through the flaunting of wealth 
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gained overseas, becoming labelled as ‘nabobs’3. It teaches the virtues of efficient and 
lean administration – but not so lean as to be unable to deal with local difficulties 
without calling on state aid. It demonstrates the importance on MNC mandate and 
how easy it is for this to escalate and shift, often imperceptibly and surreptitiously. It 
teaches that the central business of MNCs is politics by other means – whether by 
bribery, corruption, inducements, favours – soft power – or through acting as a quasi 
state, enforcing rules and its conception of local order. It teaches the importance of 
keeping the home government on side: returned nabobs such as Clive used their 
wealth to bribe MPs and buy parliamentary seats in Rotten Boroughs. It teaches about 
the shifting balance of power between centre and periphery endemic to all MNCs. It 
teaches the importance of serendipity, randomness and events in the life of great 
companies: had not the Portuguese and Dutch got further east first the East India 
Company would never have become so entrenched in India. Had it not come to 
dominate the Indian trade then it might not have become so implicated in the trade of 
smuggling opium from India into China. Had Clive not won victory at Plassy the 
Company might have remained a commercial rather than taxing and administrative 
enterprise. It reminds us that the East India Company failed one really important test: 
when best to exit.   
It could be objected that the militarization of the Company and its role in 
exerting sovereignty over conquered territory is far from contemporary practice but 
recall the Second Gulf war in Iraq in which companies such as Blackstone became 
sub-contracting warriors on behalf of the US state and its occupying forces. In the 
nineteenth century wars were fought over opium; in the twenty first century they are 
fought over oil. The commodities change; the global politics and the role of 
multinationals do not. The lines between commerce and militarism were fudged and 
blurred by the Company in a precedent that should inspire all companies in the 
contemporary military-industrial complex. 
 The East India Company was, indeed, a harbinger of the modern world; it 
created the template for a thoroughly modern MNC. In destroying the Indian cotton 
industry with what Marx and Engels (1844) referred to as the artillery of cheap prices, 
a lesson that modern multinationals have learnt in diverse product markets in 
                                                 
3A nabob was an Anglo-Indian term that referred an East India Company servant who had become 
wealthy through corrupt trade and other practices. 
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commodities in the post war era, most recently by virtue of extensive subcontracting 
through supply chains rooted in the very territories that the Company and its rivals 
once dominated.  
They dominated these territories not only through economic trade. The 
Company’s power and authority in the Indian subcontinent relied upon garrison, in 
which the vast majority of troops were indigenes, commanded by a small cadre of 
British officers. As Darwin argued, because of the danger that British officials might 
be drawn into partnership with local Indian networks of influence, as well as the fear 
of rebellion that materialized and ended the Company in 1857, ‘no white person in 
India could escape the constant reminder – by history, myth and commemoration – 
that racial solidarity was the price of survival’. The Passage to India, as Forster so 
skilfully explored, placed the white British subject in a web of institutionalized 
racism, in all of its complexity, that reached everywhere that these subjects traded, 
conquered and settled. Imperialism was a state of mind as much as it was a garrison 
state. Most significantly, as the character of Dr Aziz shows in Forster’s remarkable 
novel, it was not a state of mind that constituted a social relation: the power relations 
that the Company exemplified produced patterns of subordinated consciousness just 
as much as they produced the arrogance of rulership. 
 
Conclusion 
In conclusion, there are uncanny parallels with the experiences of the 
Company in the sub-continent and present day adventures. It was the Company’s fear 
of growing Russian influence that led them to invade Afghanistan in 1839 and occupy 
Kabul until 1842. An army of 20,000 soldiers and 38,000 auxiliaries and camp 
followers was involved. Life in occupied Kabul was sweet for the Company men but 
expensive for the Company: many bribes to warlords were necessary to maintain the 
peace and as the costs mounted the bribes slowed. In 1842 one of these warlords, 
Akbar Khan, began to organize tribal groups dissatisfied with the cessation of bribes 
from the Company under the pressure of commercial exigency. Akbar Khan laid siege 
to Kabul and negotiated an orderly retreat for the Company through the Hindu Kush 
to Jalalabad for the military and camp followers, with the Company leaving for 
Jalalabad with 16,000 people. After having laid siege to Kabul, Akbul Khan destroyed 
the garrison facilities and killed those left behind. Of the 16,000 who trekked to 
Jalalabad only one European and a few Indian sepoys survived as the tribesmen cut 
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them down in the passes and hills. The costs and perils of military and commercial 
adventure in Afghanistan is one lesson still to be learned, as is humility before the 
arrogance of rulership.  
I began this chapter by asking what kind of multinational the East India 
Company was and the extent to which it prefigured more contemporary forms of 
multinational enterprise. The answer is evident: it was an extraordinarily exploitative 
multinational with a very flexible focus: it was a trader, merchant, mercenary, military 
force and civil administrator, a pioneer bureaucracy as well as being a lean operation. 
In contemporary terms some of its activities prefigure the privatization of military 
activities by multinationals such as Blackwater, which after the Iraq War morphed 
into Academi or firms such as Constellis. In other respects it bears more resemblance 
to major drug cartels such as Mexico’s Sinaloa Cartel or the co-involvement of the 
CIA and the Nicaraguan Contras. In yet other respects it resembles Amazon, trading 
in a vats range of commodities. Whether considered as a multinational drug dealer, 
multinational security services provider, or multinational merchant in commodities it 
is evident that the East India Company prefigured many elements of multinational 
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